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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE FTC AND THE SHERMAN ACT
Buried near the end of the lengthy majority opinion in the case of
Aetna Portland Cement Company v. Federal Trade Commission' appears
the statement that certain of the petitioners, seeking review of a cease
and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission, had claimed
that, as the original complaint stated a cause of action under the Sherman
Act, the commission was lacking in jurisdiction to act as the enforcing
agency. Since the majority of the court failed to find evidence sufficient
to support the cease and desist order, hence directed that the same be
vacated and set aside, it refused to discuss or decide that issue.2 It would
seem, however, not only from the very language of the Federal Trade
Commission Act' but also from light shed by other trade regulations.
statutes and their accompanying legislative background, that the Federal
Trade Commission has been arrogating to itself a jurisdiction which it
does not, and should not, possess.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,' prior to its amend-
ment in 1938, declared "unfair methods of competition" in interstate
commerce to be unlawful without defining that term. It also gave the
commission authority, whenever it should have reason to believe that
any unfair method of competition was being employed and if it should
appear to be in the public interest, to institute a proceeding to determine
the facts and, after hearing, to enter a cease and desist order in the event
its findings supported the conclusion that unfair methods of competition
had been so employed. If, by "unfair methods of competition," Congress
intended to include combinations in restraint of trade, then the Commission
would have authority to enjoin violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Otherwise it would not. Other sections in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as well as provisions in other trade regulation acts, would indicate
that such was not the intention of Congress, but rather that its intention
was to make the commission merely an investigating adjunct of the
Department of Justice which was to continue to enforce the Sherman
Antitrust Act as it had done before.
1157 F. (2d) 533 (1946). Evans. C. J.. wrote a dissenting opinion. It is under-
stood that certiorari has been granted: - U. S. -. 67 S. Ct. 967, 91 L. Ed. (adv.)
786 (1947).
2 157 F. (2d) 533 at 574.
3 15 U. S. C. A. § 41 et seq.
4.98 Stat. 719: 15 U. S. C. A. § 45.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The first indication of this is to be found in Section 6 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.5 The first two paragraphs thereof state that
the commission shall have general power to investigate organizations
engaged in commerce and to require reports from them.6 While these
two paragraphs confer wide investigatory power upon the commission.
the following three paragraphs relate specifically to the investigation
of activities involving violations of the antitrust acts.7  Of these, the first
gives the commission authority, upon its own initiative, to make an
investigation into the manner in which any final decree entered in any
suit brought by the United States against a corporation to prevent and
restrain any violation of the antitrust acts have been carried out.8 The
second9 states that upon the direction of the President, or of either House
bf Congress,'0 the commission shall have power to investigate and report
the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust acts by any
corporation. The third provides that, upon the application of the Attorney
'General, the commission shall have power to investigate and make recom-
mendations for the readjustment of the business of any corporation
alleged to be violating the antitrust acts. 1
One further section of the Federal Trade Commission Act relates to
the duty of the commission as regards the Sherman Antitrust Act. This
is Section 7. It provides that in any suit in equity brought by the
Attorney General, the court may, upon the conclusion of the testimony,
if it feels that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer the suit to the
commission acting as a master in chancery to ascertain and report back
an appropriate form of decree to be entered therein.12  Any reading of
these sections makes it obvious that the sole duty of the commission, so
far as the Sherman Antitrust Act is concerned, is limited to the function
of investigation with the rendition of some concomitant report upon
which action is to be taken, if at all, by other duly constituted authorities.
'15 U. S. C. A. § 46.
Banks and common carriers are excepted.
7 These acts are defined, by Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U. S. C. A. § 44, to include the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq., and
that part of the Wilson Tariff Act prohibiting combinations in restraint of import
trade, 15 U. S. C. A. § 8.
s 15 U. S. C. A. § 46(c). The provision requires that such action be taken upon
the application of the Attorney General and further directs that a report of any
investigation conducted, embodying both findings and recommendations, be filed with
him.
sIbid. § 46(d).
10 A concurrent resolution by both houses has been necessary to initiate an in-
vestigation under this provision since June 16. 1933: 15 U. S. C. A. § 46a.
11 15 U. S. C. A. § 46(e).
32 Ibid., § 47.
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Much the same purpose is evidenced in the Webb-Pomerene Act.
Section 4 thereof declares that the unfair methods of competition pro-
hibited and the remedies against the same provided for in the Federal
Trade Commission Act shall be construed as extending to unfair methods
of competition used in export trade against competitors in export trade.'"
Section 2 thereof exempts associations "entered into for the sole purpose
of engaging in export trade" as well as agreements made or acts done
in the course of export trade by such associations, provided first that
such association, agreement, or act, is not in restraint of trade within
the United States and is not in restraint of the export trade of any
domestic competitor of such association, and second that such association
(toes not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter into any agree-
ments, understandings, or conspiracy, or do any act which substantially
lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade
therein."4
If the unfair methods of competition referred to in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and incorporated into the Webb-Pomerene Act, include
a combination in restraint of trade, it would follow that, in the com-
mission's administration of the Webb-Pomerene Act, it would have power
to institute a proceeding to enjoin a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by an association engaged in the export business. However, just as
an exception was carved out of the Federal Trade Commission Act, so
has one been carved out of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In Section 5 of the
latter, after setting forth provisions for investigations and reports similar
to those already analyzed, Congress provided that whenever the commission
should have reason to believe that an export association had made any
agreement or had done any act which resulted in a restraint of trade
within the United States, it should investigate and make recommendations
to the association for the readjustment of the business of the violator, if
a violation had been found. If the association then failed to comply with
the recommendations so made, the commission was directed to "refer its
findings and recommendations to the Attorney General of the United
States for such action thereon as he may deem proper."" While Congress
added that, for the purpose of enforcing these provisions, the commission
should enjoy all of the powers conferred on it, so far as applicable, when
supervising domestic commerce, it can be seen that the commission's
powers merely paralleled those conferred under the Federal Trade
Commission Act and in no way enlarged thereon.
The Webb-Pomerene Act was recently before the Supreme Court in
1:1 Ibid., § 64.




the case of United States Alkali Export Association v. United States."
It was there argued that the Attorney General had no power to institute
a suit to restrain a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act by an export
association without a prior investigation and report by the Federal Trade
Commission. The court nevertheless ruled that authority to enforce the
Sherman Antitrust Act rested with the Attorney General and that it
was not a prerequisite to his action that an investigation be made and
a report be furnished by the commission. While the court acknowledged
that the Webb-Pomerene Act empowered the commission to investigate
and report, it expressly declared that the statute "gave the Commission
no authority to make any order or impose any prohibition or restraint,
or make any binding adjudication with respect to these violations.'"'7
The petitioner had urged that the commission had primary jurisdiction
under the Webb-Pomerene Act and that Congress could not have con-
templated the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the Attorney General.
In that connection, the petitioner had properly pointed out that whenever
Congress had intended to provide for concurrent jurisdiction over trade
regulation acts it had specifically provided for it. 8 In answer to this,
however, the court said that it "overlooks the fact that the Commission's
authority is to investigate and recommend, not to restrain violations of
the anti-trust laws (save as they may incidentally be violations of other
statutes, which the Commission may enforce). The Commission, by its
investigations and recommendations, may render a useful service in
bringing violations to the attention of the Department of Justice or by
showing that resort to the courts is unnecessary, either because there
has been no violation or because the associations have satisfactorily
corrected their trade practices. But the Commission, under the Webb-
Pomerene Act, does not enforce the antitrust laws; its powers are exhausted
when it has referred its findings to the Attorney General. Indeed, the
provisions for such reference are necessary not because the Commission
has primary jurisdiction, but only because it can not itself enforce
antitrust laws. "19
The pattern which emerges from a comparison of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Clayton Act, in their
relation to the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act, is clear. With
the exception specifically noted in the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission has no power to enforce any of the antitrust laws although
16 325 U. S. 196, 65 S. Ct. 1120, 89 L. Ed. 1554 (1945).
17 325 U. S. 196 at 206, 65 S. Ct. 1120, 89 L. Ed. 1554 at 1562.
18 Under the Clayton Act, for example, enforcement may take the form of cease
and desist orders entered by the commission, 15 U. S. C. A. § 21, or by a suit in
equity instituted under the direction of the Attorney General, 15 U. S. C. A. § 25.
19 325 U. S. 196 at 208, 65 S. Ct. 1120, 89 L. Ed. 1554 at 1563-4.
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it does have power to investigate and report so as to aid the Attorney
General in the performance of his duties.
A brief reference to the legislative history of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as well as to a statement by the first chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission confirms this conclusion beyond question.
Senator Newlands, chairman of the committee sponsoring the act, when
discussing its meaning before the Senate, said: "This bill does not
interfere with the Attorney General in the administration of the antitrust
law. There has been a great indisposition to change in any way the
Sherman antitrust law, in which the country has confidence, or to change
the agency through which that law is to be administered, so that this bill
leaves the powers of the Attorney General as complete as ever with
reference to the enforcement of the antitrust law. So far as my individual
opinion is concerned, I would favor an entire turning over of the
administration of the antitrust law to this Commission, as contributing
to greater precision, greater certainty, greater consecutiveness in the
prosecution of corporate outlaws; but public sentiment is not yet prepared
for that step, so I yield to the judgment of this Committee in that
particular."' 0 He continued: "All the powers of this commission are
in aid of the courts and in aid of the Attorney General, and are not
intended to interfere with his control over the enforcement of the Sherman
law."
Still later in the discussion, Senator Newlands added: "As I have
already explained with regard to an amendment which I have offered
to section 5, this proviso is intended to leave the antitrust law in all its
strength and vigor. It is intended to leave all its provisions untouched.
It is intended to leave its administration in the hands to which it is now
committed; and the section simply adds a prohibition of an act which,
under some circumstances, is forbidden by the antitrust law, but under
other circumstances can not be reached by the antitrust law.''21
To make it clear that the 'commission was not to be regarded as an
agency charged with the responsibility for the enforcement of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Section 11 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was
adopted. It declared that: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
prevent or interfere with the enforcement of the provisions of the antitrust
Act or the Acts to regulate commerce, nor shall anything contained in the
Act be construed to alter, modify, or repeal the said antitrust Act or the
Acts to regulate commerce or any parts thereof."
'22
20 Cong. Rec., Vol. LI, p. 11,083. Italics added.
21 Ibid., p. 11,532. Italics added.
22 38 Stat. 724. Subsequent minor changes have not changed the sense of this
statement.
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When the Senate was later considering the passage of the Clayton
Act, Senator Walsh said, with reference to the relationship of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to the Sherman Antitrust Act, that: "When we
had the trade commission bill under consideration we were accused time
and time again of giving an alternate remedy to the Government in
relation to violations of the Sherman antitrust law, and over and over
-igain the assurance was given from this floor that nothing of the kind was
contemplated by that legislation at all. It was said that the Attorney
General would have a choice, under the law, whether he should proceed
to enforce the Sherman antitrust law in accordance with its original
provisions or whether he should hale offenders against that law before
the trade commission for the purpose of punishing them as therein
provided. We told the Senate again and again that that was not the
purpose, that the two were intended to cover practices that were essentially
different."" The commission itself, at least once upon a time, seemed
to agree with these conclusions for its first chairman, testifying before
a Senate committee considering the then proposed Webb-Pomerene Act,
said, in discussing the enforcement powers of the commission, that "We
have nothing to do with the Sherman law. If they violate the Sherman
Law, that is up to the Department of Justice.' '24
These views are in decided contrast to the position which the Federal
Trade Commission has taken in recent years. Judging by its attitude as
illustrated in the Aetna Portland Cement case and similar cases, it is
seeking to share with the Department of Justice the function of enforcing
the antitrust laws. It should be required to return to its limited function
unless Congress sees fit to confer upon it what is, at present, a non-
existent jurisdiction.
It is no answer to say that numerous cases have tacitly accepted this
claimed right. In none of them does it appear that this lack of authority
has been presented in any comprehensive argument or has been considered
in the light of the legislative history. The presence of such cases has led
one author to state: "The Commission early in its history believed that
violations of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act constituted an
unfair method of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. It frequently pleads in its complaints what really amounts to a
criminal indictment under the Sherman Act, and the courts have held
that a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, illegal
under the Sherman Act is an unfair method of competition under the
2 Cong. Ree., Vol. LI, p. 14,460. Italics added.
24 Testimony of Edward N. Hurley, Jan. 5. 1917. See Hearings before the Commis-
sion on Interstate Commerce, U'. S. Senate, 64th Cong., p. 65.
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Federal Trade Commission Act."' 25  In the majority of the cases cited,
however, there was no consideration given to the point here concerned.
The United States Supreme Court, in Federal Trade Clommission v.
Gra.tz,0 did say that "it is for the courts, not the Commission ultimately
to determine as a mnatter of law" what the words "unfair methods of
competition," as used in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 7
are to cover. But it did not hold them applicable to cover an alleged
violation of the antitrust laws for it there determined to go to the merits
of the charge and decided that no violation had occurred. Nevertheless
the phrase seems to have been seized upon to support the contrary view.
In a later case, that of Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Commission,28 the same court also said: "If the purpose and practice
of the combination . . . run[s] counter to the public policy declared
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission has the
power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition."29 It almost
immediately thereafter noted, however, that the complaint before it was
based on Section 3 of the Clayton Act3" and there is no question as to
the commission's right to initiate proceedings thereunder. 1  Taken as
applying to the other antitrust acts, the remark is dictum and was
obviously made without complete consideration of the pertinent historical
background.
The spate of cases reported by the several Circuit Courts of Appeal
are, generally, no more thoughtfully considered in this respect and in
the main assume that the commission has jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, in Wholesale Grocers' Association v. Federal Trade Com-
mission,32 said that it may "be inferred that the lawmakers . . intended
to include concerted action to eliminate competition in pursuance of
what amounts to a conspiracy . . . within the meaning of the Sherman
Act,''3 but it did not elucidate upon the basis for such an inference.
The Second Circuit, in Butterick Publishing Company v. Federal Trade
Commission,3 4 noting that the commission was not an agency for the
25 Beer. Federal Trade Law and Practice (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1942), p. 93.
He also notes the extent of the commission's practice by indicating that up to
October. 1939, it had issued a total of 267 orders in cases of that character: ibid.,
p. 94, note 47.
26253 U. S. 421 at 427, 40 S. Ct. 572, 64 L. Ed. 993 at 996 (1920).
27 15 U. S. C. A. § 45.
28 312 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941).
29312 U. S. 457 at 463, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 at 952.
30 15 U. S. C. A. § 14.
:1 Ibid., § 21.
.2277 F. 657 (1922).
33 277 F. 657 at 664.
3485 F. (2d) 522 (1936).
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enforcement of the Sherman Act, nevertheless said that act ' does require
consideration in deciding what, in view of the public policy so declared,
are unfair methods of competition which the Commission is authorized
to suppress. "5 Its only authority for that remark was the case of Federal
Trade Comnission v. Beech-Nut Packing Company,3c but in that case the
court itself noted that the antitrust acts were not involved since no
unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy was charged to exist. Four
years later, in Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission,"
the same circuit in reliance upon its earlier holding said: "We believe
that the boycott employed by the Guild is one that is unlawful under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . . Hence the Federal Trade Commission
was justified in concluding that the Guild's method of restraining
competition was unfair and in entering its cease and desist order.'
'
13
Not until the case of Eugene Dietzgen Company v. Federal Trade
Commission " does the question appear to have been again raised but then
the Seventh Circuit brushed it aside with the curt remark: "This
argument is not a new one. It has been frequently advanced and text
writers have dealt with and rejected it. "4 ° Except for the superficial
examination found in these cases, the other adjudicated decisions fail to
take any cognizance of the absence of jurisdiction or recognize that there
is a difference between the powers of the commission under certain of
the antitrust laws as contrasted with the power conferred by the Clayton
Act.
Perhaps some court may yet conduct a thorough investigation into
the absence of a legal basis for the unwarranted assumption of power by
the Federal Trade Commission observed in the Aetna Portland Cement
and similar cases and may yet remind it that it is only a "creature of
legislative fiat."
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
EJECTMENT-RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES-WHETHER OR NOT
EQUITABLE DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS MAY PRESENTLY BE INTERPOSED
IN EJECTMENT PRocEEDiNGs-Whether the Illinois Ejectment Act, as it
now stands, works such a procedural reform as to permit the filing of
equitable defenses and counterclaims was the question involved in the
3585 F. (2d) 522 at 525-6.
36257 U. S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307 (1922).
37 109 F. (2d) 175 (1940).
38 109 F. (2d) 175 at 176.
39 142 F. (2d) 321 (1944).
40142 F. (2d) 321 at 326.
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recent case of Horner v. Jamieson.1 The action was for ejectment, brought
by a mortgagor against the grantees of the purchaser at mortgage fore-
closure sale, under which plaintiff sought to recover possession of a small
triangular tract of land which he claimed to own but which had not been
included in the mortgage. The defendants filed an answer containing
a general denial and a counterclaim interposing an equitable defense to
the effect that the mortgagor was estopped from asserting title by reason
of his having represented to the mortgagee that the triangular tract in
question was included in the premises given as security, and had used
the proceeds of the loan to complete a greenhouse thereon. Over plaintiff's
objection that no provision existed in law for the filing of an equitable
counterclaim in such an action, the trial court found for the defendants
and perpetually enjoined plaintiff from claiming possession of the disputed
land. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court because a freehold was
involved, the decree was affirmed, the court holding that equitable defenses
and counterclaims might be pleaded in an ejectment action to the same
extent as would be permitted in other civil actions.
Prior to 1935, the rule was well established in this state that estoppel
,in pais was not available as a defense to an action of ejectment.2 As only
the legal title was involved, the courts followed the common-law rule in
refusing to allow any equitable title or defense to be offered to defeat
the action.3 That same rule was also applied to the statutory action for
forcible entry and detainer, 4 as where defendant might seek to show that
a conveyance, while absolute on its face, was really intended as a mortgage.
The principal objection to allowing such equitable defenses has been said
to be the fact that it would involve the law courts in a violation of the
parol evidence rule.5 Seemingly applied without exception,6 the rule
was consistently enforced until 1935, the date of certain amendments to
the Ejectment Act. No case appears thereafter, until the instant one,
presenting the question so the radical nature of the procedural reforms
1 394 Ill. 222, 68 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946).
2 Metzger v. Horn, 312 Il. 173, 143 N. E. 408 (1924) ; Winslow v. Cooper, 104 Ill.
235 (1882) ; Fischer v. Eslaman, 68 Ill. 78 (1873) ; Mills v. Graves, 38 I1. 455, 87
Am. Dec. 314 (1865).
3 Neil v. Kennedy, 319 Il. 75, 149 N. E. 775 (1925) ; Randolph v. Hinek, 288 Ill.
99, 123 N. E. 273 (1919) ; Hayden v. McClockey, 161 Ill. 351, 43 N. E. 1091 (1896).
4 B. 0. & C. R. R. Co. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 137 Ill. 9, 27 N. E. 38 (1891) : Meyer v.
Surkin, 262 Ill. App. 83 (1931).
5 Fleming v. Carter, 70 Ill. 286 (1873).
6 But see State Bank of St. Charles v. Burr. 283 Ill. App. 337 (1936), where a
deed, lease and option to repurchase were construed together as one transaction,
creating a mortgage, and the defense was permitted to defeat an action of forcible
entry and detainer. The case was criticized in 25 Ill. B. J. 79 on the ground that the
court, without making mention of the fact, was allowing an equitable defense to a
law action.
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declared by this decision must rest. solely upon statutory changes made
in the common-law rule.
It should be noted at the outset that the Civil Practice Act was
originally designed to exclude certain statutory remedies, including the
action of ejectment, from its provisions. 7  Shortly after its enactment,
however, section 50 of the Ejectment Act was amended so as to stipulate
that the Civil Practice Act and all rules adopted pursuant thereto were
to apply to proceedings of that character except as might be otherwise
expressly provided.' Section 10 thereof was likewise amended so as to
conform the procedural methods in ejectment to those followed in other
civil actions.9 Some indication of the nature of the change accomplished
is given by the case of Firke v. McClure, ° in which ejectment action
plaintiff failed to file a reply to a verified answer setting forth the
affirmative defense of adverse possession and was deemed to have admitted
the truth of such defensive allegation, just as would be the case in other
civil suits." The instant case furnishes still another indication of the
extent to which change has been produced.
Code jurisdictions generally, endeavoring to develop a single, all-
inclusive civil action, have accepted the precept that equitable defenses
are to be regarded as available in what would have, formerly, been
regarded as purely legal actions.12 The Illinois act also makes provision
for the joinder of legal and equitable matters in pleading, stipulating
that the defendant may set up in his answer "any and all cross-demands,
whatever, whether in the nature of recoupment, set-off, cross bill in equity
or otherwise, "13 even though it may not have gone as far as some states
in producing a fusion between law and equity. The joining of equitable
demands with legal ones has been permitted under this section, 1 4 subject
to an exercise of discretion by the court with respect to conducting separate
trials of the legal and equitable issues,1 5 although separate trials may be
7ll. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 125.
s Laws 1935, p. 786: Il. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 45. § 50. The Ejectment Act still
permits the use of a general denial, Ch. 45. § 19. although that form of answer is
forbidden in other civil actions: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 164(1).
9 Ibid., p. 787; Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 45, § 10.
10389 Ill. 543, 60 N. E. (2d) 220 (1945).
i1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 110, § 164.
12 Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th Ed., §§ 26-35.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 168. Italics added. Although the counterclaim
here interposed fitted into neither of the categories of "recoupment, set-off, or cross
bill in equity," it did amount to a "cross-demand" by defendant against plaintiff for
it would formerly have supported a separate suit in equity to enjoin prosecution of
the law action.
14 Kronan Building & Loan Ass'n v. Medeck, 368 111. 118. 13 N. E. (2d) 66 (1938)
Barry v. Knight, 296 II. App. 277, 15 N. E. (2d) 999 (1938).
S5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.11.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
dispensed with where no jury is employed.16 That view is also sanctioned
by section 43 of the Civil Practice Act which makes provision for the
use of separately designated and numbered counts which may be either
legal or equitable in character.17 There is no basis in reason for any
distinction between the privileges accorded to a plaintiff and those granted
to a defendant, so the argument that, in actions of ejectment, the court
is without jurisdiction to adjust the equities must and should fail.
No change in substantive rights under the guise of procedural reform
is effected by such a decision. The rule has long existed in this state
that a court of equity will, in a proper case, enjoin the prosecution of a
law action,"8 even to the point of recognizing equities in favor of a party
who, as a defendant in an ejectment action, would find his claims in-
admissible there."' But as the power to enjoin the prosecution of a law
action is sparingly exercised, 20 the facility of the new procedure affords
the defendant a much better remedy for getting his claims before the
court. The fact that complete relief is thereby made possible in one suit,
with a consequent decrease in the amount of litigation and expense,
unquestionably justifies the action of the legislature in enacting the
amendments under consideration.
In other jurisdictions, either by virtue of express statute or by a
fusion of law and equity, equitable defenses have been unanimously
permitted in ejectment actions.21  Where so permitted, a question has
Is Ibid., Ch. 110, § 168.
17 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167.
is The basis for equitable relief is said to lie in the fact that the defendant has
some equitable defense which cannot be considered in a court of law either by rea-
son of want of jurisdiction or from the infirmity of the legal process: County of
Cook v. City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 524, 42 N. E. 67 (1895) ; Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago v. Chiniquy, 74 Ill. 317 (1874).
19 The claim that an absolute deed was in fact a mortgage, inadmissible in eject-
ment, has justified resort to equity where it was possible to show the true character
of the instrument: Ladd v. Ladd, 252 Ill. 43. 96 N. E. 561 (1911) ; Finlon v. Clark,
118 IIl. 32, 7 N. E. 475 (1886).
20 Lindheimer v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 263 Ill. App. 524 (1931).
21 Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 283 F. 150 (1922) : Gates v. Gray,
85 Ark. 25, 106 S. W. 947. 122 Am. St. Rep. 19 (1907) ; Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal.
557. 261 P. 1017 (1927) ; Cheney v. Crandell, 28 Colo. 383, 65 P. 56 (1901) ; Tilman
v. Niemira, 99 Fla. 833, 127 So. 588 (1930) ; Adler v. Sewall, 29 Ind. 598 (1868) ;
Detmers v. Russell, 212 Iowa 767. 237 N. W. 494 (1931) : Taylor v. Danley. 83 Kan.
646, 112 P. 595. 21 Ann. Cas. 1241 (1911) : Falck v. Barlow, 110 Md. 159, 72 A. 678,
17 Ann. Cas. 249 (1909) : Hewitt v. Price. 204 Mo. 31, 102 S. W. 647. 120 Am. St.
Rep. 681 (1907) ; Tillson v. Halloway. 90 Neb. 481. 134 N. W. 232 (1912) ; Newborn
v. Peart. 200 N. Y. S. 890. 121 Misc. 221 (1923). reversed on other grounds, 219 App.
Div. 249, 219 N. Y. S. 146 (1927): Talley v. Kingfisher Improvement Co.. 24 Okla.
472, 103 P. 591, 20 Ann. Cas. 352 (1.909): Gordon v. Adams, 125 Ore. 662. 268 P.
60 (1928), modified on other grounds. 126 Ore. 586, 270 P. 474 (1928) Kenn v.
McKenzie, 23 S. D. 111, 120 N. W. 781 (1909) : Neill v. Keese. 5 Tex. 23., 51 Am.
Dec. 746 (1849): Britt v. Bauman. 199 Wis. 514. 226 N. W. 955 (1929) : Allen v.
Houn. 30 Wyo. 186, 219 P. 573, rehearing den. 29 Wyo. 413, 213 P. 757 (1923).
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arisen whether the liberal rule which lets in proof of any matters in bar
under a general denial should be extended so as to let in equitable
defenses. 22 The decisions on that score are not altogether uniform. Under
what appears to be the majority view, equitable defenses cannot be proven
in support of a general denial but must be set forth with the same
particularity as would be required in a bill for equitable relief.23 A
distinction has been drawn in some states, however, for it has there been
held that if a defendant has an equity which serves to negative the
plaintiff's right to possession such equity may be proved under a general
denial, but otherwise such states adhere to the rule that where the defend-
ant seeks affirmative equitable relief he must plead the facts entitling him
thereto in the form of a counterclaim. 4  In such jurisdictions, forms of
equitable estoppel like the one in the instant case have been deemed
available under the general issue.25
That specific question remains unsettled for the moment in Illinois
as the defense of estoppel offered in the instant case was raised by way
of counterclaim, resulted in affirmative relief in the form of an injunction,
and no criticism was addressed to the manner of pleading. Prior to 1935,
a defendant in ejectment was limited to the use of a plea of the general
issue or to a demurrer to the declaration.26 As now revised, the statute
22 A distinction between equitable and other types of defenses was made in East
v. Peden, 108 Ind. 92 at 94, 8 N. E. 722 at 723 (1886), when the court said: "As to
what constitutes an equitable defense, the better view, and that supported by the
weight of authority, seems to be that any state of facts which would entitle the
defendant, in a proper case, to the reformation of an instrument, or which would,
under the former practice, if set up in a bill for that purpose, invoke the aid of a
court of chancery for relief against the claim or title put forward by the plaintiff,
would be a defense coming within that definition." For a collection of examples of
equitable defenses generally, see 19 C. J., Ejectment, §§ 79-87; 18 Am. Jur., Eject-
ment, §§ 60-2.
23 Arguello v. Bours, 67 Cal. 447, 8 P. 49 (1885) ; Feller v. Lee, 225 Mo. 319, 124
S. W. 11129 (1910) ; Ming v. Foote, 9 Mont. 201, 23 P. 515 (1890) ; Brady v. Hlusby,
21 Nev. 453, 33 P. 801 (1.893) : Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N. C. 511. 29 S. E. 773
(1898) ; McClary v. Ricks, 11 N. D. 38, 88 N. W. 1042 (1902) ; Anderson v. Ras-
mussen, 5 Wyo. 44, 36 P. 820 (1894).
24 In Freeman v. Brewster, 70 Minn. 203 at 209, 72 N. W. 1068 at 1070 (1897).
the court stated: "If he [defendant] has an equitable estate, which, as it exists and
without any affirmative relief, defeats plaintiff's claim to possession, it may be
proved under a general denial, being strictly defensive in nature. But if the equity
is such that it does not give the defendant the right of possession as against the
legal title, without affirmative relief enforcing the equity, then the defendant must
plead the facts entitling him to such relief, the matter being in the nature of a
counterclaim." The statement was approved in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Walker. 77
Minn. 438, 80 N. W. 618 (1899). See also Dale v. Hunneman, 12 Neb. 221, 10 N. E.
711 (1881).
25 McGill v. Dartist, 69 Fla. 587. 68 So. 755 (1915) : Mowers v. Evers. 117 Mich.
93. 75 N. W. 290 (1898) ; Creque v. Sears. 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 123 (1879) : Witcover v.
Grant, 93 S. C. 190, 76 S. E. 274 (1911) ; Fitch v. Walsh, 94 Neb. 32, 142 N. W. 293
(1913).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 45, § 19.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
provides that the defendant may file any appropriate motion as in ordinary
civil suits or may answer by way of general denial, specific denial, or
affirmative defense.2  The scope of a general denial is defined by the
statute to be broad enough to permit the defendant to introduce any
matters which may tend to defeat the plaintiff's action.28  It would
seem that proof of an equitable estoppel would be permissible under a
general denial, but attention must be drawn to a section of the Civil
Practice Act which expressly declares estoppel to be an affirmative defense
and requires that it be specifically pleaded.29  The intimate connection
now existing between the two statutes suggests, therefore, that the method
of pleading adopted in the instant case is the correct one to be followed
hereafter.
J. P. RAUSCHERT
27 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 45, § 19.
2S Ibid., Ch. 45, § 21.
29 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167(4).
